Abstract-We address a crucial element of applied information extraction-accurate identification of basic security entities in text-by evaluating previous methods and presenting new labelers. Our survey reveals that the previous efforts have not been tested on documents similar to the targeted sources (news articles, blogs, tweets, etc.) and that no sufficiently large publicly available annotated corpus of these documents exists. By assembling a representative test corpus, we perform a quantitative evaluation of previous methods in a realistic setting, revealing an overall lack of recall, and giving insight to the models' beneficial and inhibiting elements. In particular, our results show that many previous efforts overfit to the non-representative test corpora in this domain. Informed by this evaluation, we present three novel cyber entity extractors, which seek to leverage the available labeled data but remain worthwhile on the more diverse documents encountered in the wild. Each new model increases the state of the art in recall, with maximal or near maximal F1 score. Our results establish that the state of the art in cyber entity tagging is characterized by F1 = 0.61.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Timely and historical security information resides in a variety of online sources, such as security blogs, news documents, vendor bulletins, forum posts, and databases. Moreover, network security analysts depend on these documents for understanding their assets' vulnerabilities, prioritizing patches, tracing clues during forensic efforts, and understanding emerging threats. Recently, research efforts to explore consequential new capabilities made possible by successful cyber information extraction are appearing in the literature [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . As evidenced in previous works, off-the-shelf Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools are incapable of isolating security-relevant entities [2, 3, 11] . Hence, the current practice for retrieval of security information from unstructured text documents is still predominantly manual, and automated extraction methods are insufficient but sorely needed. Accurate identification of basic security entities is a crucial first step for all such research and is the focus of this work.
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and Joshi et al. [13] attempt to leverage this powerful machinery for cyber entity extraction. Specifically, both use maximum entropy models with history-based features (meaning decoding of a current word can depend on all words in the sentence but only the labels given to previous words in the sentence). See Ratnaparkhi et al. [15] for history-based MEM details. As described in Lal's thesis [16] , Joshi et al. employ CoreNLP (see Manning et al. [17] ), an off-the-shelf tool for training an entity recognizer on a given labeled corpus. Bridges et al. provide a custom Python implementation allowing more flexible features and using an averaged perceptron training algorithm which has been empirically proven more effective than maximum likelihood techniques [18, 19] . See Table IV , presenting features of these works alongside others.
The main hurdle of these two works is creation of an annotated corpus necessary for training. While Joshi et al. painstakingly hand label a corpus of ∼50,000 tokens, Bridges et al. craft a set of heuristics that leverage the structured data of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 1 to label associated text, and the result is a large (∼750,000 token) automatically-labeled corpus. 2 Both training corpora are predominantly comprised of short description fields from vulnerability databases and vendor bulletins, which have a limited writing style and are not representative of the multitude of text sources security analysts target, e.g., blogs, news documents, forums, tweets. Furthermore, text from security databases and vendor bulletins, while full of valuable information, are accompanied by structured information fields and therefore not the aim of NLP efforts. As both models employ features designed to encode the structure of the text, we hypothesize that these features will produce models overfit to nonrepresentative training sets and struggle when used in the wild.
In addition to the supervised methods above, Jones et al. [14] implement a cyber entity tagger as a preprocessing step for a relation extraction framework. Following the automatic labeling techniques established by Bridges et al. [11] (used to create an annotated training corpus), Jones et al. query 1 The publicly available National Vulnerability Database (NVD), https://nvd.nist.gov/, gives additional information fields to entries of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database https://cve.mitre.org/. 2 McNeil et al. [12] implement a semi-supervised bootstrapping algorithm that both learns heuristics for identification of cyber entities and learns instances of the entities by iteratively cycling through a large unannotated corpus. While we do not build on this clever method to automatically generate heuristics, we do incorporate heuristic-based extraction techniques in both our evaluation of previous works and our development of a new extractor.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we seek to understand the efficacy of the previous cyber entity extraction methods using documents from a variety of diverse securityrelevant sources. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that supervised methods are overfit to unrepresentative training data and produce quantitative evaluation of Jones et al.'s heuristic method. Second, we aim to craft and test cyber entity extraction capabilities that leverage all the resources-publicly available, labeled (although limited) corpora, previously investigated labeling techniques-available to provide optimal extraction capabilities (maximal F1 score).
II. PREREQUISITES
In order to create a realistic setting for head-to-head comparison of extraction algorithms, we require a common set of entities, a single representative test corpus, and basic understanding of the previous algorithms. Below we give details of these prerequisites.
A. Common Labels
Before evaluation, we require a core set of well-defined entity types that are integral to the security domain. Our categories follow those of Jones et al. [14] and Bridges et al. [11] , which agreed, and map readily to the cyber security ontology of Iannacone et al. [1] . See Table II for the complete list of labels used for evaluation. Both software applications and operating systems references are given the common label "SW Product". The "SW Symbol" category refers to elements of code such as filenames, functions, methods, and classes. "MS ID" is a Microsoft Bulletin identifier, and "CVE ID" refers to the vulnerability identification used by CVE and NVD. While the categories of Joshi et al. [13] captured much of the same information, they are organized differently, and the labels are not directly transferable. We note that Jones et al. and Bridges et al. included a category for "Vulnerability Relevant Term", which parallels the union of "Attack", "Means", "Consequences", and "Network Terms" labels of Joshi et al. Ground truth for these categories is ambiguous; for example, deciding if a word or phrase is indeed relevant to understanding vulnerabilities is subjective. To promote fair evaluation, in this section we have omitted these categories because ground truth is ambiguous, although we agree that in practice such categories can extract important details.
B. Test Corpus
To facilitate evaluation in a realistic scenario, we sampled documents from prominent and fairly obscure sources of security information including news documents, well-edited blogs (e.g., Krebs on Security), unedited blogs, mailing lists, and tweets. Our goal in creation of the corpus was to produce a set of documents that are representative of the text security analysts must manually consult for security information. Although CVE, NVD, and vendor sites, such as Microsoft Bulletin, 4 provide text descriptions that discuss important information, they are accompanied by structured databases. Automated text extraction is not vital for these sources, and we do not include them in our test corpus. Lastly, we ensure no two documents discuss similar topics to prevent any bias. See Table III for test corpus details.
C. Maximum Entropy Models
Maximum entropy models (MEMs) have excelled in sequential labeling tasks because they admit a wide variety of features; for example, features can be designed to encode parts of speech, word capitalization, and combinations of other features. As previous supervised cyber entity extraction works used MEMs, a short introduction is provided.
Both Bridges et al. [11] and Joshi et al. [13] employ MEMs. To perform the labeling, features are created that can depend on all the words in the sentence and on the predicted labels of the previous words in the sentence. 5 More specifically, denoting a sentencew = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and supposing we have 4 technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ 5 We note that CoreNLP, the framework used by Joshi et al., supports features that can depend on all labels in the sentence (not just previously labeled words) although no such features were used.
Publication
Type Algorithm Training Corpus [12] Semi-Supervised Bootstrapping Unannotated [13] Supervised Maximum Entropy Hand Annotated ∼50k Tokens [11] Supervised Maximum Entropy Auto Labeled ∼750k Tokens [14] Unsupervised + Distant Supervised Heuristics N/A labeled the first j−1 < n words with labelst = (t 1 , . . . , t j−1 ), the probability of tag t j being assigned to word w j is given by
where f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) denotes the feature vector, v = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) are feature weights to be learned from the training data, and z(w, t) ≡ t exp[f (w, t,t) · v], i.e., z is the appropriate constant to ensure the sum over Equation 1 over all possible tags is one. An example of a feature (i.e., a component of the feature vector f ) is
t j−1 = SW Vendor, and w j−1 = "the". 0 else.
Once features are set, the model parameters v (the feature weights) are fit to a given annotated training corpus. Common fitting algorithms involve optimization of the likelihood estimate, or online methods such as the averaged perceptron [18, 19] . Traditionally, and in the Bridges et al., Joshi et al. works, bigram and trigram features are used to encode the sequential elements of text.
III. EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS METHODS
In this section we describe our implementation of the previously proposed entity extraction algorithms and present results evaluating each algorithm on a common set of documents. Our aim is to test the algorithms in a realistic scenario and facilitate direct comparison. Further, we investigate two questions-(1) Are the supervised methods in the literature overfit to a nonrepresentative test corpus? and (2) How effective is simply using well-crafted heuristics and publicly available lists of cyber entities for extraction? En route to these answers we hope to illuminate what features of the text are most indicative of cyber entities in support of the greater goal of finding the best possible extractor with the available resources.
A. Previous Supervised Models
As described in Lal's thesis [16] [11] that are terms descriptive of vulnerabilities or attack consequences and are similar to the "Attack" entity type in [13] . SW Symbol includes file names and named elements of code such as functions, methods, and classes. training an entity recognizer on a given labeled corpus. While convenient, the use of CoreNLP limits the features available to users. After consulting Lal's thesis [16] , and the CoreNLP documentation, we outline their features in Table IV along with other models. For training data, a corpus of ∼50,000 tokens is painstakingly hand annotated and is now publicly available. 6 Unfortunately, the labels used in this corpus do not map readily to our labels; in particular, software vendors, products, and some versions are lumped into a single category, "Software". While we cannot evaluate their original model on our test corpus, we do examine a MEM equipped with the same features and trained on the other publicly available labeled corpus introduced by Bridges et al., which shares our labels.
The training corpus created by Bridges et al. [11] is relatively large (∼750,000 tokens) and is comprised of descriptions from NVD, MS-Bulletin, and Metasploit modules. To produce the annotations, Bridges et al. craft a set of heuristics to match entities in the structured fields of the NVD database with their occurrences in the corresponding text. Next, a set of regular expressions for identifying versions and other entities is used to apply additional labels. The precision and recall of this "automatically labeled" corpus are reported greater than 0.99 and 0.75, respectively, which is acquired by handchecking a random sample.
To facilitate flexible feature creation, Bridges et al. implement their own MEM and craft novel features including regular expressions for words in the sentence and parts of speech. Their implementation used the averaged perceptron for training, which has produced competitive results in accuracy and has proven more effective than maximum likelihood techniques [18, 19] . Table IV enumerates the complete list of features used. Furthermore, Bridges et al. provide the automatically labeled corpus, their heuristics for automatically labeling the corpus, and their MEM implementation in Python. 7 We have adapted the Python MEM implementation made public by Bridges et al. for our experiments. All MEMs in this paper used the averaged perceptron training algorithm with five iterations through this corpus. For each of the feature sets described in Table IV Note: The notation w k , p k , h k , and t k denote the k th word, part of speech, heuristic tag, and predicted tag, respectively. Table above lists feature types relative to current index j, e.g., the current word is denoted wj. "Bias" feature type always fires and biases the model towards the frequency of the labels. "Prefix"/"Suffix" features match the first/last six characters of the word. "Regex-1" refers to a collection of eight regular expressions, namely, first letter capitalization, interior letter capitalization, first character digit, interior character digit, punctuation, underscore, left parenthesis, right parenthesis. "Regex-2" refers to a collection of five regular expressions targeting CVE and MS Bulletin IDs, and version numbers. (*) Joshi et al. used a single gazetteer corresponding to their "Software" label, which encompassed both vendors and products. To admit the more specific labels, we use the corresponding two gazetteers. Table V gives results when evaluated on the remaining 20% of the training corpus and on the representative test documents. Considering models 1 & 2 in the table, we observe both MEMs with previously proposed features achieve ∼95% precision and recall on the held out section of the corpus, yet both struggle on the actual news, blogs, forum documents-exhibiting ∼65% precision and less than 40% recall. This shows that the features are adequate for fitting the training data but produce inaccurate results when used in the wild. Clearly, the differences between the training corpus and real documents are causing the problems, but exactly why these models struggle on the real documents is not obvious. To delve into this issue we investigate heuristics for identifying entities and feature sets that depend less on the structure of the sentence.
B. Comparison to Heuristic Tagging
As a preprocessing step to their relation extraction algorithm, Jones et al. [14] reconfigure the automatic labeling developed by Bridges et al. [11] (which was used only to annotate a training corpus) to label cyber entities in general documents. This entailed querying Freebase's API to create gazetteers of software vendors and then applying the previously used heuristics. We note that the original work of Jones et al. provided no evaluation of this extraction capability. Using both Freebase and the code made available by Bridges et al. we have recreated this entity tagger, and present its tagging abilities in line 3 of Table V. The heuristics exhibit ∼ 12% increase in both precision and recall over the previous supervised models, which is perhaps surprising considering the lack of sophistication of the algorithm.
We draw a number of conclusions. First, supervised techniques, although impressive in other domains (e.g., part of speech tagging), are unable to produce adequate results on realistic documents when configured with traditional features, e.g., bigrams of words, and tags. Our evidence suggests these features cause overfitting to the writing styles of the available annotated text. While we have not tested the Joshi corpus (as it has different labels), we expect a similar phenomenon as it is approximately 80% text from vendor sites and vulnerability databases. Next, the increase in both precision and recall exhibited by the heuristics gives insights into what features are indicative of cyber entities; in particular, leveraging available resources such as Freebase, where nearly comprehensive lists of entities reside, is a simple and effective approach. Further, regular expressions, e.g., matching version numbering patterns or camel-and snakecase, are features that gain traction in this domain. Looking forward, this evaluation of previous methods begs the question "How do we create the 'best' cyber entity extractor with the available resources-annotated documents of non-representative text, well-developed models for fitting labeled data, very precise heuristics, and publicly available databases on the subject?" IV. EXPLORING NEW MODELS Informed by the evaluation of previous models, we now seek more effective extraction capabilities with the available resources. While the training corpus may not have a representative writing style, it does include a multitude of securityentities. To leverage this corpus, we seek features that allow a MEM to be ported to general documents after training.
First, we reconfigure the MEM's features to encode less of the sequential structure of the text by considering a bag- Note: Precision, Recall, and F1 score given. All maximum entropy models (MEMs) fit using five iterations of averaged perceptron training on 80% of corpus of Bridges et al [11] , and results on remaining 20% reported. Heuristic tagger is from Jones et al. [14] . Novel models below midline increase recall while nearly fixing F1. Results show the current state of the art is bounded by F1 = 0.61.
TABLE V CYBER ENTITY EXTRACTORS' RESULTS
of-words model, i.e. we only including features that depend on the word to be labeled. Examining the regular expressions used by the heuristic tagger, we make two exceptions; ie., we add regular expressions of the previous and current word, as many heuristics rely on these. Lastly, we include the heuristic tagger's guess of the current tag as a feature, and omit gazetteer features as they are used by the heuristic tagger. The resulting set of features is given explicitly in the "Bag of Words" column of Table IV . Considering the results (Table V  row 4) , the bag-of-word features MEM has only slightly lower precision than previous MEMs, but yields a higher recall than any previous model. When evaluated on a held-out test set, the bag-of-words MEM performs worse overall than the previous MEMs, which is unsurprising as it has fewer features.
Next, we note that the precision of the heuristic labeling is very high (0.804), meaning when the heuristics have identified an entity, they are correct more than 80% of the time. To harness this, we create a tandem labeler. In a first pass words are labeled using the heuristics. Next, a MEM is used to tag only those words that are not labeled by the heuristics. We test the tandem labeler with two feature sets, the bag-of-words model and a set of features that includes every previously used feature. Our impetus for using all the features is that this MEM is only trained on the words of the corpus that were not identified by the heuristics; hence, words labeled by the heuristics will appear before and after words the MEM attempts to label. To take the positive heuristics into account, we include features that look forward and backward in the "All" feature set (last column Table IV) . Rows 5 and 6 of Table V give the tandem labeling results. Both exhibit a substantial increase in recall over all previous models, while maintaining F1 score.
Looking over all models, we find a maximal F1 score of 0.61, with four models achieving nearby results. This presents users with a choice of models to weight precision/recall between 80/49% to 60/61%. We note that a number of other experiments were conducted, but not presented to respect length requirements and because the results were not as noteworthy. Using sequential bigrams of the heuristics' labels produced good but not superior results. In additional experiments we added a prior distribution by initializing weights to favor features inspired by the heuristics. Results varied little from using no prior (initiating weights to 0), and inspection of the trained model's weights showed that those features were receiving very high weight regardless of the prior.
In summary, our experimentation concludes that for balanced precision and recall the tandem models are superior, and if one requires high precision at the expense of recall, the plain heuristics are best.
V. CONCLUSION
Our evaluation of the previous models shows that they exhibit low recall. As the previous supervised models achieve impressive results on the held-out training documents, their shortcomings on our representative test corpus is certainly caused by the disparity between the available annotated corpora and the target security source documents. Further evidence for our hypothesis that sequential features are causing the overfitting is given by the results of the new MEM with bag-of-words features. Although it is trained on the same corpus, it achieves comparable precision, and far greater recall than the previous models. We conclude that if only supervised techniques are used on the available corpus, features should encode indicative elements of the word to be tagged in lieu of sequential elements of the text.
Our tandem models give even greater increases in recall and both maintain the maximal F1 score of 0.61. This establishes the current state of the art in cyber entity extraction. Furthermore, as four of the models (the heuristic labeler and the three new labelers) examined obtain near maximal F1, our work offers the operator a tradeoff between precision and recall, albeit discrete.
Looking forward, we predict that to obtain very high precision and recall, a substantial training corpus of documents taken from a variety of sources and hand labeled by annotators seasoned in the security domain will be necessary. Such a corpus presupposes a universally accepted set of labels, and work to develop an ontology of the cyber domain is the topic of research, e.g. [1] and to some degree already in practice in MITRE's STIX 8 standard. On the other hand, the feasibility of this endeavor is suspect. Aside from human resources needed to attempt such an endeavor, technology evolves so quickly that many entity names will be quickly obsolete while others will not appear in slightly aged texts. With this view, it is perhaps unsurprising that simple heuristic methods, which can leverage regularly updated, nearly comprehensive lists of security entities, sources such as Wikipedia, are making substantial contributions to the state of the art in this field. We hope our use of novel features and interplay of heuristics with the traditional, sophisticated methods will assist securityrelevant information extraction as the field develops.
